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Adjudicating Dignity:
Judicial Motivations and Justice Kennedy’s
Jurisprudence of Dignity
by ALLYSON C. YANKLE AND DANIEL TAGLIARINA*
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The
Constitution grants them that right.1
- Justice Kennedy, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Introduction
In Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the
Supreme Court announced that the fundamental right to marriage extended
to same sex marriages. While the decision itself made headlines, there was
a flurry of coverage concerning the importance of dignity inherent in the
decision. Some coverage of the Obergefell decision highlighted quotes from
the majority and dissenting decisions with Kennedy’s line concerning equal
dignity often grabbing top billing.3 Other writers, from diverse sources such
as New Civil Rights Movement, The New Republic, Crisis Magazine, and
commentary on the Heritage Foundation’s website, traced Kennedy’s use of
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* Allyson C. Yankle, Ph.D., is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Lycoming College. Daniel Tagliarina, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in Government and Politics
at Utica College.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. E.g., The Editorial Board, A Profound Ruling Delivers Justice on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/opinion/a-profound-ruling-deliversjustice-on-gay-marriage.html; Brian Levin, Our Love Is Equal: Justice Kennedy and Civil Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-levin-jd/our-love-isequal-justice_b_7673114.html; Adam B. Lerner, The Supreme Court’s Most Memorable Quotes
on Gay Marriage, POLITICO (June 26, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/supremecourt-justices-opinions-memorable-quotes-gay-marriage-119477.html (containing a remarkably
straightforward title for our purposes).
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dignity in Obergefell back to previous decisions. Some authors, from the
National Review to Slate and The Atlantic, wrestled with the legal argument
within the Kennedy decision as well as the possible far-reaching
consequences and “undetermined legacy” about the right to dignity.5 While
different outlets engaged in multiple ways with Kennedy’s usage of dignity,
the media recognized the importance of dignity within the Obergefell
decision.
This concept, however, did not magically appear in the Obergefell
decision, or even in the earlier, related decision of United States v. Windsor.6
The constitutional argument for dignity has been a consistent principle for
Kennedy dating back at least as far as his 1988 Senate confirmation hearings.
Responding to a question from Senator Leahy concerning fundamental rights
that are judicially enforceable, then-Judge Kennedy answered, “We look to
the concepts of individuality and liberty and dignity that those who drafted
the Constitution understood . . . We see whether or not the right has been
accepted as part of the rights of a free people in the historical interpretation
of our own Constitution and the intentions of the framers.”7 He later
elaborated that the right of human dignity could be considered based upon,
“the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the anguish to the person,
the inability of the person to manifest his or her own personality, the inability
of a person to obtain his or her own self-fulfillment, [and] the inability of a
person to reach his or her own potential.”8 What emerges from his Senate
testimony is the concept of the right to human dignity and its relation to
constitutional interpretation, privacy, equal protection, and due process
rights.
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4. E.g., Claude Summers, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence of Dignity (June 7, 2016),
https://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/2016/06/new_blog; Eric Sasson, The LGBT
Movement’s Supreme Court Hero: Anthony Kennedy, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 26, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/122182/lgbt-movements-supreme-court-hero-anthony-kennedy;
Anthony Esolen, On Justice Kennedy’s Tenuous Grasp of Human Dignity, CRISIS MAGAZINE (July
2, 2015), http://www.crisismagazine.com/2015/on-justice-kennedys-tenuous-grasp-of-humandignity; David Azerrad, Justice Kennedy and the Lonely Promethean Man of Liberalism, THE
HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/node/1282/print-display.
5. See, e.g., Howard Slugh, Justice Kennedy’s Judicial Power Grab, NAT’L REV. (July 1,
2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/07/obergefell-and-constitution/; Katherine Franke,
“Dignity” Could Be Dangerous at the Supreme Court, SLATE (June 25, 2015), https://slate.com
/human-interest/2015/06/in-the-scotus-same-sex-marriage-case-a-dignity-rationale-could-be-dang
erous.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Danger of a Constitutional “Right to Dignity”, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-doctrine-ofdignity/391796/.
6. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
7. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 86 (1987) (testimony
of Judge Anthony M. Kennedy).
8. Id.

41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 8 Side A

04/24/2019 08:06:49

YANKLE+TAGLIARINA_FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2019]

ADJUDICATING DIGNITY

4/15/2019 12:59 PM

715

The legal community has not ignored Kennedy’s use and development
of the right to dignity expanding across a range of case issue areas. For
instance, Siegel9 considers the use of dignity as the guiding structure of the
undue burden test employed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey10 and Gonzales v. Carhart.11 Broadly, she notes that
Kennedy has utilized the concept of dignity in substantive due process and
equal protection cases in three distinct ways to mean either life, liberty, or
equality.12 Yoshino finds a similar relationship between substantive due
process, liberty, and dignity.13 He argues that Kennedy’s use of dignity
differs in Obergefell14 compared to Lawrence v. Texas,15 Casey,16 and
Windsor17 when discussing the possibility of establishing a new form of
equality in constitutional law.18 In a completely different direction,
Althouse19 examines Kennedy’s use of dignity in relation to state’s rights
and new federalism within the context of his decision in Alden v. Maine.20
While these case issue areas are distinct Tribe argues that for Kennedy “there
is no significant gap between the older concept of dignity [found in
Alden] . . . and the newer concept of dignity” in Obergefell.21 What
Obergefell does, however, is mark the articulation of the doctrine of equal
dignity based upon Kennedy’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause and
Equal Protection Clause.22 Kennedy’s invocation of dignity in his written
opinion is, thus, well documented in both the media and legal communities.
Though there has been a great amount written about the content as well
as methods of constitutional interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s legal
decisions, we investigate how Kennedy has been able to develop and expand
on legal concepts, such as dignity, on the Supreme Court. To be clear, this
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9. Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
12. Siegel, supra note 9, at 1737.
13. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 147 (2015).
14. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
15. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
18. Yoshino, supra note 13.
19. Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 245 (2005).
20. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
21. Lawrence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16,
22 (2015).
22. Id.
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is not a story about Kennedy’s theory of constitutional interpretation or
development of a legal doctrine. Rather, we use Kennedy’s opinions as a
case study to examine how institutional position on the Supreme Court
allows median justices to look beyond policy goals and consider legal goals
and motivations in their decision-making. Drawing primarily on scholarship
concerning legal motivation and the decision-making of Supreme Court
median justices, we argue that Kennedy’s institutional position as median
justice allows him to articulate and advance the legal concept of dignity. Our
goal for this paper is to better understand the institutional importance of the
median justice in shaping legal language through the examination of
Kennedy’s use, articulation, and application of dignity.

I. Justice Kennedy and Dignity:
The Influence of Institutional Position and Legal Motivations

23. HOWARD GILLMAN & CORNELL W. CLAYTON, Introduction, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 3 (Howard Gillman & Cornell W.
Clayton eds., 1999).
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Our analysis engages with theories about the behavior of the median
justice and how median justices may be effective in pursuing legal
motivations and goals while on the bench. Studies concerning judicial
behavior have typically focused on judicial votes across terms or case issue
areas to explain outcomes in the decisions or understanding how certain
justices may vote. While this type of research may give a broad perspective
to the mechanisms of the theories, we choose a different approach.
Specifically, we start from the perspective that “institutional settings are an
omnipresent feature of our attempts to pursue a preferred course of action”
and that “different contexts make it more or less possible for individuals to
act on different sets of beliefs.”23
To accomplish this, we focus on one single justice—Justice Kennedy.
We examine where he has invoked and articulated his concept of dignity,
cross-referenced with his institutional position on the Supreme Court, to
show how his institutional position has aided his approach and allowed him
to pursue legal motivations. First, we review the current literature about
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in addition to research from judicial politics
concerning median justices and legal goals and motivations. Next, we
introduce our methodology and data before presenting our analysis. Finally,
we highlight the key patterns we find that suggest the importance of
institutional position by demonstrating Kennedy’s consistent use of dignity,
which also increases when Kennedy is the median justice especially in
majority opinions in narrowly decided cases.
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A. Justice Kennedy and Looking for “Dignity”
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24. FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY
MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009).
25. KNOWLES, supra note 24, at 36–48.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 198.
28. COLUCCI, supra note 24 passim.
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In the introduction, we noted that multiple legal scholars examined
Justice Kennedy’s use of dignity in his opinions, but that political scientists
have not paid as great of attention to his use of dignity as a legal concept.
While we are only using Kennedy’s opinions as a case study, we would be
remiss to ignore the valuable insights scholars have made into the justice’s
method of interpretation. This includes two key studies24 concerning his
method of constitutional interpretation (or lack thereof) and jurisprudence of
liberty that address dignity as a part of liberty. While Justice Kennedy is
often portrayed as a justice that draws criticism for not having a cohesive
jurisprudential philosophy, both challenge this portrayal by focusing on the
importance of liberty in Kennedy’s decisions and providing a cohesion to his
jurisprudence despite his own protestations otherwise. Importantly for us,
this work demonstrates the influence of dignity within Kennedy’s
jurisprudence.
Drawing on individual liberties cases, Knowles argues that Kennedy’s
jurisprudence is consistent and moderately libertarian consisting of three
elements.25 First, there is the belief in the toleration of different viewpoints
by the government; second, the importance of dignity in relation to personal
liberty against government attempts to classify individuals; and third,
personal responsibility that allows some government interference due to the
relation between rights and responsibility.26 She argues that Kennedy’s use
of dignity is based on the “libertarian belief that an individual’s dignity is
violated by government actions that treat that person in a particular way
because of their possession of a certain characteristic.”27 For Knowles, the
emphasis on dignity informs the humane aspect of Kennedy’s jurisprudence
and corresponds with individual autonomy (liberty) to determine their own
identity.
Similarly, Colucci argues that Kennedy has a cohesive jurisprudence
that focuses on the importance of liberty and, like Knowles, sees dignity as
being a part of liberty.28 He characterizes Kennedy as believing “that the
Western concepts of liberty and human dignity serve as foundations for the
U.S. Constitution” and that “this conception of liberty requires judicial
sensitivity to the many ways in which government actions . . . can prevent
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COLUCCI, supra note 24 at 35.
Id. at 168.
See generally COLUCCI, supra note 24; see generally KNOWLES, supra note 24.
See generally COLUCCI, supra note 24; see generally KNOWLES, supra note 24.
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29.
30.
31.
32.
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individuals from fully developing their own personalities.”
Unlike
Knowles, Colucci extends his analysis of Kennedy’s usage of dignity beyond
individual rights to issues arising under federalism and separation of powers.
Kennedy’s use of dignity in this realm of case law comes to the federal
government respecting individual autonomy; however, it is state sovereignty
and not individuals that must be respected.30
Both Colucci and Knowles raise the importance of dignity within
Kennedy’s jurisprudence.31 According to Colucci and Knowles, dignity is
part of how Kennedy considers liberty and is a central part of his judicial
philosophy and process of decision making.32 While many justices claim to
be motivated by a concern for protecting liberty, dignity, as its own legal
concept, seems to be unique to Kennedy. Colucci and Knowles both
acknowledge that Kennedy cares about dignity, but they do not emphasize
this as a unique legal concern for Kennedy. This is where we break from
this informative work. Dignity is not the core of Kennedy’s overarching
judicial philosophy, but rather is a legal concept that he believes belongs in
American law, that is already present in law, and he tries to shape what it
means for the American political system. He informed the Senate Judiciary
Committee of this fact during his confirmation hearings and, as we explain
later in this piece, he discusses it in written decisions in almost every term
he served on the Supreme Court. We argue that he has been able to pursue
the further articulation of dignity because he is the median justice.
Our analysis focuses on this specific concept rather than the broader
concept of liberty because entrenching dignity within case law is, in many
ways, a more tangible goal than shifting philosophical and legal notions of
liberty. Moreover, as a study about a median justice’s pursuit of legal goals
and concepts, dignity is prevalent throughout Kennedy’s jurisprudence,
presented clearly in his opinions, and is more uniquely a province of
Kennedy’s writings, compared to other justices, than liberty is. Taken
together, this suggests that dignity is important to Kennedy, that it is possible
to trace this specific concept through his opinions, and that it is a legal goal
that is peculiar to him. Consequently, dignity, as Kennedy’s unique legal
concern, allows us to investigate our claims regarding the institutional
position of median justices. As is noted in the literature (and discussed
below), median justices often demonstrate behavior different from their
peers. Looking at Kennedy as an example of a median justice, and dignity
rather than the more expansive concept of liberty, allows us to investigate
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the importance of the median justice’s institutional position for legal
motivations.

B. Median Justice

04/24/2019 08:06:49

33. See THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (2005); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005).
34. See, e.g., Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch
Conservative?, 52 THE J. OF POLITICS 530 (1990); Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The
“Swing Voter” Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free Speech,
57 POLITICAL RES. Q. 209 (2004).
35. See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POLITICAL ANALYSIS 134
(2002) (creating and justifying a measure of judicial ideology that situates justices into an
ideological spectrum, with measures for each justice specific to each Court term).
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We seek to explain why the institutional position of the median justice
matters for obtaining legal goals and content by looking at one specific
justice and one specific goal. Within the context of judicial decision-making,
there is the assumption that the median justice influences the majority
opinion.33 This influence makes understanding the median justice important
for understanding the decision-making process on the Court, as well as the
ultimate rulings the Court issues. However, we must first address what is
meant by “median” justice and how this relates to decision-making.
There are two popular conceptions of median justice in the literature.
On the one hand, the median justice is conceptualized as when a justice is an
ideological swing vote and crosses the ideological divide or voting blocs.
Studies that have considered swing justice have looked at the behavior of a
specific justice being the crucial vote—being the most likely to be in the
majority of ideologically divergent groups of justices—in cases decided by
a 5-4 vote.34 On the other hand, the median justice may also be the middle
justice based upon a specific term’s ideological spectrum.35
While we primarily focus on the idea of the median justice based on a
term’s specific ideological spectrum, we also pay attention to voting blocs in
narrowly decided cases. We primarily focus on the ideological middle point
as this person is, inherently, the balancing point for potential ideological
shifts in rulings. Any 5-4 ruling that breaks along ideological lines would
see the median justice as the one logically most likely to shift the balance.
Of course, not all 5-4 rulings are decided strictly on ideology, as other issues
could intervene to lead to different voting blocs. For this reason we also
consider the importance of narrowly divided cases, as we would expect the
median justice—in this case acting as a swing justice—to have the most sway
on the ultimate content of the opinion as the other justices in the majority
could not afford to lose the “swing” vote, and with it their majority coalition.
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In our analysis below we provide data on term median justices, as well as
draw attention to where Kennedy uses dignity in closely divided cases.
As applied by the attitudinal model, all justices—whether at the
ideological extremes or middle of the spectrum—will vote according to their
ideological preferences.36 Research, however, suggests that the median
justice—regardless of how it is defined—is less likely to rely on simple
ideological considerations than their colleagues on the ideological wings of
the Court. This may help to explain the lack of voting consistency37 and
variance in the magnitude of ideological voting.38 Building upon these
insights of the decision making of the median justice, we argue that the
median justice is particularly well situated to pursue legal goals and
motivations, and not just policy preferences and ideological considerations.
Even with difference in definition, multiple studies have demonstrated
that numerous factors influence the decision-making of median justices that
go beyond personal policy preferences. In their study of Kennedy acting as
the swing justice, Schmidt and Yalof39 raise the idea that a swing voter on
the Court may emerge based upon ideology, facts of the case, or internal
institutional factors. More broadly, median justices who function as
ideological swing justices may vote in an unexpected ideological direction
due to greater reliance on case-specific factors,40 the presence of the Solicitor
General as a party,41 oral arguments,42 and controlling precedent and legal
facts of the case.43 Likewise, justices that are towards the ideological median


41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 10 Side B
04/24/2019 08:06:49

36. See JEFFREY ALLAN SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
37. See Paul M. Collins, The Consistency of Judicial Choice, 70 THE J. OF POLITICS 861
(2008).
38. See Brandon L. Bartels, Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the
Magnitude of Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 AMERICAN POLITICS RES. 142
(2011).
39. See Schmidt & Yalof, supra note 34.
40. See Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 THE J. OF POLITICS
1089 (2013).
41. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda
Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POLITICAL RES. Q. 765 passim (2011).
42. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson et al., The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 100 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCI. REV. 99 passim (2006).
43. See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter?
Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCI. REV. 369 passim (2008); see MICHAEL A BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE
CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE passim (2011); see
Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy
and Jurisprudence, 71 THE J. OF POLITICS 1062 passim (2009).
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44. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 THE J. OF POLITICS 169 (1996).
45. See Black & Owens, supra note 41; see Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 40; see Mark J.
Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCI. REV. 305 (2002).
46. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
47. See, e.g., Blasecki, supra note 34
48. See, e.g., Schmidt & Yalof, supra note 34.
49. Martin & Quinn, supra note 35.
50. Id. at 151.
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during a term may be influenced by public opinion, legal considerations,45
or other strategic influences.46
As a whole, the literature on median justices suggests that justices in
this institutional position are more likely to take into account other factors
beyond personal policy preferences. This leads us to argue that ideologically
median justices are not only more likely to consider factors other than policy
preferences, but also are likely to use their position as the middle point of the
Court to shape judicial opinions to reflect their legal considerations. In terms
of Kennedy, our example of a median justice in this paper, we expect him to
write dignity into his legal opinions most often when he is serving as the
ideological middle point of the Court, and even more so when he is also in
the majority of a narrowly divided case. Thus, when the median justice is
“median” in both common uses of the term, this justice is most enabled to
pursue legal motivations, and we expect to see evidence of this in their
written opinions.
One final debate concerning the median justice within the literature that
we need to address is who counts as the median justice. Studies have
investigated particular justices to understand if their voting behavior
identifies said justice as the median justice, in terms of the ideological swing
vote, on the Supreme Court. These studies focus on one particular justice,
such as Justice Powell47 and Justice Kennedy.48 More commonly, however,
scholars have utilized ideological scores to identify the swing justices on the
Supreme Court. This effort has been led by Martin and Quinn49 to estimate
ideal points of justices’ policy preferences over time. The Martin-Quinn
scores in particular are important for identifying the probability that a justice
is the median justice in a given term.50
This split within the literature demonstrates the flexibility of the term
“median justice” such that it could apply to judicial behavior, as is the case
when median means “swing’ vote, or it could mean ideological middle point,
as is the case with Martin-Quinn scores and studies utilizing these. While
our research does focus on a specific justice, we do not assume that Kennedy
is the median justice in all of the cases. Instead, we examine his institutional
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position on the Supreme Court as it relates to his use of the right to human
dignity in his decisions.51 We look at both ideological positioning and
closely decided cases to try to account for both related uses of the term
“median justice” within the literature.

C. Judicial Motivations
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51. Table A in the Appendix specifically charts the term median justice for Kennedy’s time
on the Court, as well as the number and types of cases in which Kennedy invoked dignity each
term.
52. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 71 (1997).
53. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (2008); Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process, 36 RAND J. OF
ECONOMICS 275 (2005).
54. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. OF
POLITICAL SCI. 11, 20–21 (2013).
55. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000).
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Traditionally, judicial decision-making scholarship has advocated that
judges are motivated by their policy preferences. Whether or not they may
pursue their sincere or sophisticated preferences has been a key question in
the debate between attitudinal and strategic models of behavior, but both
have nevertheless emphasized justices and policy goals. As Baum cautions,
even when policy goals seems to be the dominate goal, “legal considerations
could affect the content of opinions to a greater, and more measureable,
degree than they affect votes.”52 In other words, legal goals and motivations
may be a factor in the decision-making, but appear more in the construction
and details of the opinions rather than the votes themselves. For this reason,
it is even more important to look at the content of opinions. Moreover,
regardless of the mechanism of decision making used, judicial opinions
shape the law after the case leaves the Court. In order to find evidence of
judicial attempts to shape the law through legal considerations, it is necessary
to examine the written opinions.
The conceptualization of legal motivations as simply seeking legal
accuracy and/or legal clarity might be shortsighted and underdeveloped. For
instance, there is the argument that external satisfaction, such as gaining
reputation, could be related to legal motivations where judges that want to
be perceived as influencers on the court and therefore may be less willing to
follow precedent.53 Alternatively, it may be simply that, “the value of
working within the existing body of law can be an important feature of a
craft orientation to judging.”54 Other works have considered personal
attributes of justices, such as reputation creators or esteems grantors as
influencing behavior and adherence to precedent.55 What becomes clear is
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56. Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. L. REV. 517, 528
(2006).
57. See Martin Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 KY. L.J. 294 (1963); C. Herman Pritchett,
The Development of Judicial Research, FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RES. (Joel Grossman & Joseph
Tannenhaus eds., 1969).
58. See Jeffrey R. Lax, The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine, 14 ANN. REV. OF
POLITICAL SCI.131 (2011).
59. Id. at 133–34.
60. Id. at 133.
61. Id. at 135–36.
62. Tiller & Cross, supra note 56, at 528–30.
63. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (First Harvard University Press
paperback ed. 2010).
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that first, it is necessary to consider beyond policy-seeking goals and second,
legal motivations are a useful place to start but that scholars should go
beyond legal clarity and accuracy in their conceptualization.
Part of this increased attention paid to the effects of legal rules, doctrine,
and precedents coincides with an emphasis to remember that the “law is both
legal and political”56 still takes into account the “jurisprudence” aspect in the
study of political jurisprudence.57 This effort to bring in law as a factor in
decision-making has led to the development of the doctrinal politics
approach, which seeks to reconcile legal realist, behavioral, and strategic
approaches to judicial politics.58 He articulates that the doctrinal politics
approach is organized around four key points: (1) greater recognition of
judicial structures, which emphasizes “legal cases as the vehicles for policy
making” and further integrates “the practice of law with a political, policyseeking perspective”; (2) more investigation about the “content and structure
of judicial preferences and legal opinions”; (3) focus more on the interaction
between legality and hierarchy; and, (4) examining “how judges use doctrine
to get what they want.”59
This doctrinal politics approach goes beyond judicial votes and argues
for a case-space model which “highlights legal cases as the vehicles for
policy making” by “integrating the practice of law with a political, policyseeking perspective.”60 In particular, Lax proposes understanding how
judges make policy using legal rules, or doctrinal instrumentalism, as well
as looking at the use of precedents and theories of interpretation as ways to
affect behavior and outcomes.61 This is similar to the theoretical and
empirical considerations with which Tiller and Cross62 engage, including
looking at the decision structures found within opinions and how legal
doctrine may mirror judicial motivations.
Posner argues that a judge’s response is a combination of factors of
legal doctrine, institutional constraints, policy preferences, and strategic
considerations among other factors.63 Here, Posner describes the judicial
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decision-making process as involving a variety of factors, including
considerations not always factored in to political science literature on
decision making, which echoes Baum’s64 insights. We take seriously the
contention that institutional context influences decision-making.
Specifically, building on the median justice’s behavior, legal motivations,
and judicial decision-making literature, we argue that median justices are
more likely to pursue legal motivations and write their ideas into the law than
other justices. Furthermore, we expect this will be particularly evident in
narrowly divided decisions where median justices have greater institutional
status to craft their decision and clearly articulate their legal goals. As a
means of testing our hypotheses, we turn to Kennedy and his development
of the legal concept of dignity as a case involving a specific median justice
interested in a specific legal concept.

II. Methodology and Data
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64. See generally BAUM, supra note 53.
65. See generally Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 40.
66. See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra note 54 passim; see generally Lax, supra note 58; see
generally Tiller & Cross, supra note 56.
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While literature about a median justice’s behavior and his or her legal
motivations may seem disconnected at first, we argue that findings about
median justices on the Supreme Court suggest that a justice in this
institutional position may be ripe for studying legal motivations and goals.
First, median justices are more likely to consider other factors, including
legal implications, when making their decisions. Second, judicial decisionmaking at the Court level traditionally shows that justices are concerned with
policy outcomes, but median justices appear to be different and are less likely
to rely on ideological considerations and personal policy preferences than
the other justices.65 If median justices are less likely to rely on their own
policy preferences, what are other possible motivations beyond policy? One
suggested answer has been a median justice’s legal motivations and goals
with more attention given to understanding the importance legal rules,
doctrine, and precedents in judicial behavior.66 If legal goals, meaning legal
rules, precedent, or doctrine affect behavior, it is necessary to understand the
circumstances that allow justices to pursue those goals beyond simple policy
decisions.
We posit that institutional position—specifically that of median
justices—places some justices in a better position to pursue their legal goals
than other justices on the Court. To do this, we focus on a single justice and
a unique legal concept: Justice Kennedy and his concept of dignity. Prior
studies of Kennedy have noted his use of dignity within his interpretation of
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67. See COLUCCI, supra note 24; see also KNOWLES, supra note 24.
68. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
69. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
70. We limit our analysis to “dignity” and the closely related “indignity,” “indignities,” and
“indignation” to let us focus on Kennedy’s legal concept of dignity. We are not trying to fully
articulate Kennedy’s concept of dignity in all of its theoretical richness, but rather, we are using the
concept as a means of studying a legal goal of a median justice. We do not expand our search to
potentially related terms, such as “honor,” “respect,” or “decency.” We hope to explore these
concepts more in our future research.
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liberty, but the focus has been more on his methods of constitutional
interpretation and jurisprudence.67 We make no claims about Kennedy’s
method of interpretation nor the development of a legal doctrine. Rather, we
trace a specific legal concept that Kennedy has articulated since his
confirmation hearing and demonstrate how his shifting institutional position
on the Court has allowed him to pursue a legal goal and expand the concept
of dignity.
For this analysis, we adopt a qualitative approach that utilizes a content
analysis. To do this, we analyze all of Kennedy’s written opinions from
when he joined the Court in 1988 through the end of the Court’s 2017-2018
term, coinciding with his retirement from the Court. Across this 30-year
period, Kennedy wrote 545 discrete opinions for the Court. However, we
include only the opinions for which Kennedy signed his name. Thus, we
exclude from our analysis per curium opinions and joined opinions. We
want to investigate Kennedy’s use of his institutional position to aid his
articulation of a legal concept regarding dignity, and thus restrict our analysis
to his signed opinions. One important point to make is that we did include
both Planned Parenthood v. Casey68 and National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB).69 These cases deserve special
mention as Kennedy coauthored the plurality opinion in Casey with Justices
O’Connor and Souter, and he coauthored a dissent with Justice Scalia in
NFIB. In NFIB, Kennedy claimed authorship over these opinions, even if it
was shared authorship, we included them in review of Kennedy’s opinions.
We subsequently searched all 545 Supreme Court opinions authored by
Kennedy for use of the word, “dignity,” or related words, including
“dignitary,” “dignified,” “indignity,” and “indignation.” We believe that
these words are similar enough to “dignity” that they were worth including
in our examination to be sure we were catching multiple ways in which
Kennedy could be articulating his stance on dignity. Of these opinions, 54
contained at least one use of dignity or one of our identified related terms.
Specifically, 48 of them make use of dignity, five use “indignity” or
“indignities,” and the remaining case uses “indignation.” These 54 cases
count for approximately 10% (9.9%) of Kennedy’s written opinions.70
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III. Analysis and Discussion
Kennedy’s use of dignity stretches across a variety of opinion types and
issues. Most of Kennedy’s uses of dignity come in his majority opinions71
(38 of the 54 cases,72 including Kennedy’s co-authored plurality opinion in
Casey 73). Additionally, in 32 of the 54 cases, Kennedy is the only justice to
invoke dignity in any of the Court’s opinions. In cases, such as U.S. v.
Windsor74 and Obergefell v. Hodges75, where Kennedy writes for the
majority, the other justices who use dignity do so in dissent, typically in
direct quotes from Kennedy’s majority opinion and often while critiquing
Kennedy’s reasoning. These numbers suggest that Kennedy works on his
own conception of dignity that is unique to his jurisprudence. He often
engages in the sole use of the phrase, and when other justices use “dignity,”
it is often to address Kennedy’s usage of the term. This suggests Kennedy
is discussing dignity in a way unique to him and that studying these uses
helps us capture the pursuit of legal goals by a median justice.
Using the Supreme Court Database76 for issue coding, we see that
Kennedy uses dignity in a variety of areas, but most often to discuss equal
protection, due process, and privacy.77 Table 1 presents the case breakdown
by issue area and legal provision for the cases where Kennedy discusses
dignity.

04/24/2019 08:06:49

71. To simplify distinctions, we counted opinions for the Court as “majority,” even if,
technically, they were plurality opinions, as was the case in Casey.
72. Of the 54 opinions where Kennedy invoked dignity or one of its related terms, 38 of them
were majority opinions, three were regular concurring opinions, three were concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, four were concurring in the judgment, and the remaining six opinions
were dissenting opinions.
73. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
74. See generally U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
75. See generally Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
76. Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2018 Supreme Court Database, Version 2017 Release 2, SUPREME
COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited March 16, 2019).
77. The data in Table 1, using the coding from the Supreme Court Database, id., reflects all
of Kennedy’s opinions during his tenure on the Supreme Court.
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Table 1: Cases Containing “Dignity”
Case Issue Area
N
Law at Issue

727

N

Criminal Procedure

17 Infrequently Litigated Statute

7

Civil Rights

Fourteenth Amendment (Due
12 Process)

6

Privacy

7

6

First Amendment

5

Economic Activity

4

Federalism

3

Eighth Amendment (Cruel and
Unusual Punishment)

4

Judicial Power

2

Eleventh Amendment

3

Due Process

2

Americans with Disabilities Act

2

Attorneys

1

Habeas Corpus

2

Miscellaneous

1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

2

No Entry in Database

2

Article III (Case and Controversy
Requirement)

1

Fourth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal
Protection)
First Amendment (Speech, Press,
Assembly)

5
5

Sixth Amendment (right to trial
by jury)

1

Fifteenth Amendment (Other)

1

Clean Air Act

1

Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts
(42 U.S.C. § 1983)

1

04/24/2019 08:06:49

1
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Fifth Amendment (Equal
Protection)
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Religious Freedom Restoration
Act

1

Sherman Act

1

Interstate Compact

1

First Amendment (free exercise
of religion)
54 Total

1
54
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78. See generally Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493
(2011).
79. See generally Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
80. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 US 502 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
81. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. TB, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
82. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. 14 (2016); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
83. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
84. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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In Table 1, we can see that Kennedy’s use of dignity occurs most often
in cases that deal with government interference in private lives (search and
seizure and privacy cases), as well as how the government treats us relative
to our personhood (abortion, cruel and unusual punishment, and race-based
discrimination).
Kennedy employs the language of dignity when it comes to government
interference in our lives. He also uses dignity when discussing governmental
actions that run the risk of degrading who we are or the intrinsic value of
human life. This allows Kennedy to link issues to dignity that, without this
concept, might otherwise seem to be separate considerations. For example,
Kennedy’s conception of dignity allows him to call for the humane treatment
of prisoners,78 question certain death penalty practices,79 reject certain
abortion restrictions while upholding others,80 reject sex-based and racebased use of preemptory challenges,81 and question the harm done by
embracing affirmative action policies.82 Furthermore, these issues all share
the central concern expressed in three of Kennedy’s most prominent cases
involving dignity, Lawrence v. Texas,83 U.S v. Windsor,84 and Obergefell v.
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85

Hodges. The central concern in these cases is the damage done to dignity
when we start to criminalize or otherwise discriminate against people’s core
identity, which in these specific cases pertains to gays and lesbians.86
Despite the rather wide range of topics, for Kennedy, each case raises
concerns about issues of dignity, and we see his efforts to articulate these
views about human dignity in his decisions.
As shown in Table 2, for Kennedy, dignity involves issues of limiting
how and when the government can become involved in the lives of
individuals. This, we label as “government interference,” which shows up
in issues of privacy, personal identity, and questions touching on the value
of human life. However, Kennedy’s use of dignity in his opinions also
appears in issues regarding what we are calling “institutional dignity,” which
pertains to sovereignty and the law. Table 2 summarizes these two forms of
dignity.
Table 2: The Contours of Dignity
Description

Government
Interference

Protection for privacy
(personal choices regarding
sex and marriage, limited
access to abortion, protection
from unreasonable search and
seizures), personal identity
(non-discrimination on the
basis of personal identifying
characteristics, such as race,
sex, or sexual orientation), and
preservation of the value of
human life (death penalty and
abortion limitations, and
requirements of human
treatment of prisoners)

Sample Cases
1) Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015)87

2) Powers v. Ohio
(1991)88

3) Roper v. Simmons
(2005)89
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85. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
86. We hesitate to go further than Kennedy actually does in any of these cases and refer to
rights for the entire LGBT community as transgender individuals, in particular, have largely been
left out of recent Court victories for gays and lesbians.
87. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
88. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
89. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 15 Side A

Type of
Dignity

41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 15 Side B

04/24/2019 08:06:49

YANKLE+TAGLIARINA_FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

730

4/15/2019 12:59 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Institutional
Dignity

Full acknowledgment and
respect of sovereignty (fair
and equal treatment of
sovereign entities, including
sovereign immunity) and of
court and the legal profession
(considerations over
maintaining the legitimacy and
majesty of our legal system)

[Vol. 46:4

1) Idaho v. Coeur
D'Alene Tribe of
Idaho (1997)90

2) Williams-Yulee v.
The Florida Bar
(2015)91

Federalism requires that Congress accord States the respect and
dignity due [to] them as residuary sovereigns and joint participants
in the Nation’s governance. Immunity from suit in federal courts
is not enough to preserve that dignity, for the indignity of
subjecting a nonconsenting State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties exists regardless
of the forum.93

521 U.S. 261 (1997).
135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Alden, 527 U.S. at 711.
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90.
91.
92.
93.
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As mentioned, Kennedy develops dignity within the law not only in
regard to government interference, but also in cases pertaining to
institutional dignity, primarily around government structures and bodies. In
these cases related to a structural part of the government, Kennedy uses
dignity to refer to the dignity owed to coequal sovereigns. An example of
this in Kennedy’s opinions in Tenth Amendment cases about respect the
dignity of states as coequal sovereigns with the national government.
Kennedy also invokes this notion of institutional dignity when writing about
the dignity that needs to be preserved in and for our legal system, as happens
in a case discussing civil forfeitures related to when defendants flee the
country. As an example of the first use, consider Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Alden v. Maine.92 Alden involves questions about the degree of
applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state probations officers and,
more specifically, whether these officers can bring suit in federal courts. As
a sovereign immunity case involving conflict between the national
government’s attempts to force states to follow federal employment
standards and states’ ability to control their own employment standards for
state employees, Kennedy discusses the importance of sovereignty and
respecting the dignity of the states. Kennedy writes:
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It remains the case, however, that the sanction of disentitlement is
most severe and so could disserve the dignitary purposes for

517 U.S. 820 (1996).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Degen, 517 U.S. at 821–22.
Id.

04/24/2019 08:06:49

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Here, we see Kennedy invoke dignity as an important part of our federal
system and as a way to analyze how sovereign entities interact in general.
Kennedy not only talks about the need for “respect and dignity,” but also
talks about what is needed to “preserve that dignity” and avoid “the
indignity” of forcing rules on sovereign entities. In this sense, dignity echoes
what Kennedy is setting up for individuals—equal treatment, liberty, and
protection from coercive governmental overreach—only applying it to state.
This suggests that, for Kennedy, dignity applies to sovereignty as it applies
to individual autonomy, and in both cases, dignity is about protecting some
inherent characteristic of an individual entity.
Kennedy provides an example of the second use of institutional dignity
as well. Instead of preserving power and respect for sovereigns, we see
Kennedy express concern for integral parts of our governmental structure,
often courts and the legal system. This is on display in Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Degen v. U.S.94 The petitioner, Brian J. Degen, who has dual
citizenship with the U.S. and Switzerland, was living in Switzerland at the
time that he was indicted under charges related to alleged drug dealings.95
Additionally, the U.S. government sought to forfeit property Degen owned
in three different states under the claim that Degen either purchased the
proper with money from his drug dealings, or he used the property to
facilitate drug sales.96 Degen refused to return to answer the criminal
charges, and he cannot be extradited back to the U.S.97 He did, however, try
to challenge the forfeiture proceedings in a separate civil matter.98 The
district court granted summary judgment for the state, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, through application of the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine” that
bars those outside of the country who refuse to answer for criminal charges
to pursue legal claims while they are fugitives.99
Kennedy spends time in his opinion considering what enforcing this
rule means for the “dignity” of the court and for the “indignity” visited upon
the courts by fugitives and their legal claims.100 He emphasizes these points
near the end of his opinion when he asserts:
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which it is invoked. The dignity of a court derives from the respect
accorded its judgments. That respect is eroded, not enhanced, by
too free a recourse to rules foreclosing consideration of claims on
the merits.101
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101. Degen, 517 U.S. at 828.
102. Id.
103. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
104. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 US 502, 531 (1990).
105. For more support of this claim, see the Appendix for information pertaining to KWIC
analysis of both types of Kennedy’s dignity opinions.
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Kennedy ultimately reverses and remands the grant of summary
judgment for further consideration.102 But, in so doing, as the above quote
shows, he wrestles with preserving the “dignity” of courts and what best
preserves this “dignitary” interest. Although maintaining the dignity of
courts is incredibly important, Kennedy feels the respect that derives from
the dignity of the courts is harmed more by refusing to consider the merits
of a case than by allowing fugitives to bring claims in court. Not only does
Kennedy consider the dignity of the court, he imparts his own understanding
of what best serves this dignity into the legal doctrine he is shaping.
Again, this is similar to how he uses dignity in the context of
individuals, where spousal notifications for abortion go against a woman’s
dignity and autonomy,103 but parental notifications for minors with a judicial
waiver do not.104 Both raise concerns regarding preserving dignity, and in
both cases Kennedy acts as the arbiter of how best to protect dignity (and
what valid dignity interests even are). Kennedy’s use of dignity expands
beyond just concern over individual human dignity to include considerations
of the dignity that is part of sovereignty or part of governing institutions,
with 15 of his dignity opinions addressing issues of sovereignty and respect
for our institutions (8 on sovereignty and 7 on institutional dignity), yet he
does so in ways that are largely consistent with how he presents individual
dignity concerns. Dignity regarding government interference is a broader
concept for Kennedy, involving the preservation of individual respect and
autonomy. Institutional dignity is about preserving sovereignty, maintaining
a coequal position between states and the national government, and is also
about what institutions are owed, or afforded. This makes both types of
dignity about preserving inherent qualities in both individuals and
institutions.105 Thus, despite the two iterations, dignity appears to be a
largely legally consistent concept for Kennedy, about preserving and
protecting inherent value and worth for both individuals and state entities,
albeit when Kennedy believes doing so is consistent with the law.
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Kennedy’s institutional position as the median justice on the Court also
contributes to his ability to formulate and express his concept of dignity. Of
the 30 full terms covered in our study, Kennedy was likely the median justice
for 16.5 of those terms (the half term is because O’Connor was the median
justice in 2005 until her retirement, at which point Kennedy became the
median justice).106 This puts Kennedy in a strong position to influence the
Court’s final vote in close cases. As Figure 1 indicates, Kennedy was more
likely to insert dignity into majority opinions than concurring opinions, and
the least likely to mention dignity in dissent. Moreover, Figure 1 captures
the impact of O’Connor’s absence, which solidified Kennedy as the median
justice. Without O’Connor on the Court, Kennedy wrote more majority and
concurring opinions concerning dignity and fewer dissents than he did when
she was still on the Court.

Figure 1:

Kennedy'sOpinionsMentioning
Dignity
60
40
20
0
Majority/Plurality
Opinions

Concurring
Opinions

TotalOpinions

AfterO'Connor'sRetirement

TotalDignityOpinoins

Not only does Kennedy mention dignity more often in opinions after
O’Connor’s retirement, he does so more often in narrowly divided cases than
in cases with high concordance among the justices. Figure 2 depicts the
number of cases where Kennedy mentions dignity by vote and by opinion
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106. See Table A in the Appendix for a breakdown of the most likely median justice for all of
these Court terms, and for the number and types of dignity opinions Kennedy wrote in these terms.
While Kennedy mentions dignity fairly consistently across his time on the Court, he does so more
often and in more majority opinions when he is the median justice, and more so after O’Connor
retires (strongly solidifying his position as the Court’s median justice). Additionally, at the time of
writing, the Martin-Quinn scores were not yet available for the 2017-2018 term, so the information
in Table A does not account for the 2017 term.
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type. Although Kennedy mentions dignity in many types of cases, he is more
likely to discuss it where the Court is split compared to when they are in
agreement. Moreover, he was more likely to discuss dignity in these divided
cases after O’Connor’s retirement.

Figure 2:

Kennedy'sOpinionsUsingDignity
byVoteandOpinionType

Majority/Plurality
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Majority/Plurality
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Majority/Plurality
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Majority/Plurality
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Unanimous

8Ͳ1or7Ͳ2

WithO'ConnorontheCourt

6Ͳ3or6Ͳ2

5Ͳ4,5Ͳ3,4Ͳ3,or4Ͳ2

AfterO'Connor'sRetirement

TotalDignityOpinoins
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Looking solely at those cases that were decided by one vote we can see
just how important Kennedy’s institutional position was for allowing him to
write his conception of dignity into law. Figure 3 shows the dignity
references by opinion in cases decided by one-vote. As shown, Kennedy
was far more likely to discuss dignity in a majority opinion (15 of his onevote dignity opinions) than in a concurring or dissenting opinion (4, each, of
his one-vote dignity opinions). This is especially true after O’Connor’s
retirement where we see Kennedy’s one-vote majority dignity opinions jump
from 4 to 11, despite this period being shorter (January 31, 2006-end of the
2017-2018 term) than the time he spent on the Court with O’Connor
(February 1988-January 31, 2006). While his concurrences mentioning
dignity stayed the same regardless of O’Connor’s presence, he mentions
dignity in dissent in a narrowly-divided case only once after she left,
compared to three times with her still on the Court.
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Figure 3:

Kennedy'sDignityOpinionsin
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We argue that these numbers strongly suggest that Kennedy was able
to use his institutional position as a median justice (especially as this position
was solidified after O’Connor’s retirement) to write dignity into the law
through is opinions. He did so more often as median justice than not, but
also more often in narrowly divided cases. As the median justice, and thus
the swing vote, he was able to use his position to control the case outcome,
and to insert his understanding of dignity into the law through majority
opinions.
Part of this institutional position also accounts for seniority. By custom,
the chief justice or the most senior justice in the majority assigns the opinion
writer in a case. As the median justice, Kennedy’s vote could swing the case
one way or the other, and one means of keeping him in the majority was to
assign the opinion to him. This could account for the increase in his majority
opinions after O’Connor’s retirement. Another factor is the retirement of
Justice John Paul Stevens on June 29, 2010. Without Stevens on the Court,
Kennedy was the most senior justice while voting with the so-called liberal
wing of the Court. After Justice Scalia’s death in 2016, Kennedy became
the senior associate justice, outranked only by Chief Justice Roberts. Each
of these changes further strengthened Kennedy’s institutional position. Each
change made it more likely that he would either assign close opinions to
himself, or that assigning justices were incentivized to assign close cases to
Kennedy. Table 3 lists the assigning justices and cases for each of the 15
majority opinions mentioning dignity that Kennedy wrote in one-vote cases.
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Putting aside Casey for a moment due the problems with discussing
assignment, we see that Rehnquist assigned two institutional dignity cases to
Kennedy, both touching on sovereignty. Stevens assigned Kennedy three
cases, all of which were government interference dignity cases relating in
one way or another to the death penalty. These assignments show Rehnquist
shoring up the conservative block with Kennedy in the two sovereignty
cases, and Stevens doing the same with the liberal block with the three death
penalty cases. Roberts did the same with the conservative block for the
government interference dignity cases Gonzales v. Carhart107 (upholding the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act) and Ziglar v. Abbasi108 (with Justices
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch not participating, and the conservative
justices on one side and Ginsburg and Breyer on the other), although
Maryland v. King,109 a Fourth Amendment government interference dignity
case, had a more mixed group with Kennedy joined by Roberts, Thomas,
Breyer, and Alito. Most of these one-vote cases have Kennedy writing about
contentious legal issues for a largely ideologically consistent block of
justices, and inserting his conception of dignity into each of those opinions.


550 U.S. 124 (2007).
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
521 U.S. 261.
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
547 US 518 (2006).
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Table 3:
One-Vote Cases Where Kennedy Mentions Dignity in a
Majority/Plurality Decision
Assigning
Justice
Case
n
Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey (1992)110
Rehnquist
3
Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene
Tribe of Idaho (1997)111
Alden v. Maine (1999)112
Roper v. Simmons (2005)113
Stevens
3
House v. Bell (2006)114
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Kennedy v. Louisiana
(2008)115
Brown v. Plata (2011)116
U.S. v. Windsor (2013)117
Hall v. Florida (2014)118
Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015)119
Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin (2016)120
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
(2017)121
Gonzales v. Carhart
(2007)122
Maryland v. King (2013)123
Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017)124

737

6

3

Note: We follow the Supreme Court Database’s lead in listing Chief Justice Rehnquist as the
assigning justice for Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992),125 relying in part on the justices’
docket books.126 Determining assigning justice is difficult here as three-member plurality
claims joint authorship of the opinion and the other justices joined various parts, but none in
whole. Rehnquist ultimately files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


554 U.S. 407 (2008).
563 U.S. 493 (2011).
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
579 U.S. 14 (2016).
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Spaeth et al., supra note 76.
563 U.S. 493 (2011).
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When we look at the narrowly decided cases where Kennedy assigned
himself the opinion, we see that they are all are fairly monumental decisions,
and all pertain to dignity protections from governmental interference. In
Brown v. Plata,127 sees Kennedy upholding a finding that California prison
overcrowding constitutes an Eight Amendment violation by virtue of

41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 19 Side B

04/24/2019 08:06:49

YANKLE+TAGLIARINA_FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

738

4/15/2019 12:59 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 46:4

128



04/24/2019 08:06:49

128. 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
129. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
130. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
131. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1.
U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
132. 579 U.S. 14 (2016).
133. 563 U.S. 493, 493 (2011).
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allowing the suit to move forward. Hall v. Florida
also involves the
Eighth Amendment. In his opinion, Kennedy declared the process of
executing individuals with cognitive impairment unconstitutional. As we
have previously stated, Windsor129 and Obergefell130 pertain to equality
protections for homosexuals in striking down portions of the Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 (“DOMA”),131 and upheld the right of same-sex
couples to marry. Finally, in Fisher,132 Kennedy finds no Fourteenth
Amendment violation in the University of Texas at Austin’s consideration
of race in determining admissions. Here as the median justice, the swing
vote, and the senior associate (for all but Plata (2011)133), Kennedy was able
to self-assign these opinions and pursue his legal goals pertaining to his
conception of dignity and what it means for various rights guarantees.
Although Kennedy seemed to be capitalizing on his position as median
justice in important ways, it is worth emphasizing that his attention to the
concept of dignity was not new to his jurisprudence. As we mentioned in
the introduction, Kennedy discusses dignity in his confirmation hearings to
become a Supreme Court justice. Once on the Court, Kennedy has crafted
at least one opinion invoking dignity in 25 of his 30 terms, starting with a
dignity case in the 1988 term, which was his first full term on the Court. Of
these 25 terms with dignity opinions, all but 3 involve at least one majority
opinion invoking dignity, this means that 22 of his 30 full terms on the Court
involve creating at least one binding precedent that makes use of the concept
of dignity. Consequently, the development of this legal concept of dignity
is not something he started after O’Connor left, or that he has implemented
only as the term median justice (although he issued dignity opinions in 14.5
of his terms as the median justice). This was a concept he has developed
over time, and as the median justice, has pursued increasingly in his
opinions.
While he had long worked on integrating dignity into case law, there is
a decided uptick in how often Kennedy had done this since O’Connor has
left the Court. After O’Connor’s retirement, Kennedy is firmly the
ideologically median justice for each of the Court’s terms, and he has the
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highest probability of all justices for being in the majority. In this period,
Kennedy wrote 30 of his 54 dignity opinions, which included 22 majority
opinions. This means that over half of all of his dignity opinions, and over
half of his dignity majority opinions came at a time when, institutionally
speaking, his vote was the most important. As shown above, this included
11 majority opinions in one-vote cases since O’Connor’s retirement. Dignity
comes up in only two of Kennedy’s dissents after O’Connor retires, and only
once in a one-vote case. The remaining dignity opinions include three
concurring opinions, two concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
opinions, and one concurring in the judgment opinion.
At first glance, it seems Kennedy was using his institutionally unique,
and important, position to shape the Court’s precedents to include his
conception of dignity. However, the fact that his use of dignity spans a much
larger period suggests that it is about much more than manipulating his
institutional position or about following policy preferences. Kennedy’s
conception of dignity and his attempts to ascribe it in law are about more
than politics and policy, as they also reflect a concern for law and doctrine.
As the median justice, Kennedy had the benefit of being able to shape the
legal opinions, not just policy outcomes, of close rulings from the Court. As
someone who has long articulated a belief in a greater role for dignity in
shaping the law, he is strategically situated to accomplish this goal. Legal
goals and motivations must be factored in when considering the institutional
role and power of median justices, with Kennedy’s development of dignity
as a legal concept as an example.

Conclusion
41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 20 Side A

We have provided reasons to believe that Kennedy has pursued his
concept of dignity as a legal goal across a variety of legal issues. We also
present evidence to suggest that Kennedy is using his institutional position
as median justice not just to pursue policy, but to follow legal motivations in
shaping doctrine. Our content analysis, while not primarily about all of the
ways Kennedy uses dignity in his opinions, does allow us to reach certain
conclusions about Kennedy’s dignity jurisprudence.
First, much of it is about figuring out what is owed to individuals and
where the state’s power runs into the protective wall of dignity. Kennedy
struggles to articulate important dignitary concerns, but these do not always
override state concerns. In this way, Kennedy is not simply using “dignity”
to pursue preferred policy outcomes, or as a catch-all term for a limitation
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134. As shown in the Appendix, the Martin-Quinn Scores for Kennedy for each term (and the
remaining half-term from the 2005 term) after O’Connor’s retirement place him firmly as the term
median justice.
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135. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 US 502 (1990); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
136. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
137. See generally Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013); City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1958; Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
139. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
140. See Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
141. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
142. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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on state power. Kennedy’s abortion jurisprudence provides a vivid example
of how he fully acknowledges the importance of bodily autonomy and choice
for dignity concerns, but is also willing to uphold at least some abortion
restrictions as either not infringing on women’s dignity135 or because of his
concerns for the dignity of human life regarding a fetus.136 Similar points
can be made regarding Kennedy’s use of dignity in Fourth Amendment
cases, where he can acknowledge dignity interests but still uphold certain
searches as non-violations of these concerns.137
Second, while complex and not guaranteed protections from state
power, it seems that dignity for Kennedy does involve some degree of
negative liberty from state overreach. It speaks to what the government is
prohibited from doing, and thus certain areas where the government must not
interfere with private, personal decisions. Lawrence138 and Obergefell139
seem to fit into this category of dignity elements, as both involve rejections
of state attempts to police sex acts and intimate relationships, including the
solidification of a loving relationship in the bonds of marriage.
Finally, Kennedy’s concept of dignity clearly involves a strong
component of equal treatment. Not just focusing on that with which the
government may not interfere, but also looking at the treatment we are owed
or how the government may conceive of us. Again, the Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases fit here, but so to do the Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment cases. In these cases, Kennedy addresses what fair,
equal, and dignified treatment of individuals requires, including those either
already in prison140 or those who have been sentenced to death.141 Kennedy’s
position on the Court has allowed him to write this version of dignity into
law.
However, this element of dignity also applies to unacceptable ways in
which the government might seek to reduce people to a single element of
their existence, especially for purposes of discrimination. This was clearly
on display in the rejection of DOMA in U.S. v. Windsor (2013),142 but also
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143. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
TB, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
144. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
145. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. 14 (2016); Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Schuette v. Coal. to
Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
146. See COLUCCI, supra note 24; KNOWLES, supra note 24.
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in various opinions touching on race. This consideration for not simplifying
people to one element allows Kennedy to reject the use of sex- and racebased preemptory challenges,143 but also race-based voting restrictions in
Hawaii enacted to protect native Hawaiians,144 or to question affirmative
action policies as potentially destructive of equal treatment and equal
dignity.145 For Kennedy, a respect of human dignity means not being
discriminated against because of who you are, nor being overly simplified to
one element of your identity. Kennedy’s concept of dignity involves
elements of due process, but also life, liberty, and equality. All of these
elements have been reflected in Kennedy’s majority opinions employing his
concept of dignity.
Justice Kennedy’s position as median voter, especially after Justice
O’Connor’s retirement, allows Kennedy to expand upon his concept of
dignity and not just for preferred policy goals. Kennedy’s use of dignity
seems to reflect the ideas he expressed regarding dignity in his confirmation
hearings. While not conclusive, and certainly an area for future studies, this
suggests continuity to Kennedy’s thinking about dignity’s place within our
law.146 His institutional position allowed him to write dignity into the
Court’s precedents. Moreover, as his use of dignity gained more outside
attention, in particular from the media in response to his opinion for the Court
in Obergefell the potential for expanded legal effect of this concept of dignity
exists. As we have argued, Kennedy’s unique position on the Court as the
median justice allows him to pursue legal considerations, including his
seemingly idiosyncratic conception of dignity. Kennedy provides an
example of how median justices can use their position to not only pursue
policy and political outcomes, but also legal considerations through attempts
to shape legal doctrine. For Justice Kennedy, dignity in its various
manifestations appears to be one such legal consideration.
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Appendix
Table A: Median Justice and Justice Kennedy’s Use of Dignity
Term

Most
Likely
Median
Justice

Probability

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

White
White
Souter
O'Connor
O'Connor

0.89
0.98
0.53
0.30
0.59

1993
1994

Kennedy
O'Connor

0.68
0.52

1995

Kennedy

0.68

1

1

1996
1997

Kennedy
Kennedy

0.68
0.82

1

1
0

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005a

Kennedy
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor

0.56
0.76
0.92
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.93
0.86

1
1

2005b
2006

Kennedy
Kennedy

0.99
1.00

2
1

2007

Kennedy

1.00

2

2

2008
2009
2010

Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy

1.00
1.00
0.99

1
3

0
4
4

2011
2012
2013

Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy

1.00
1.00
0.99

1
3
2

2014
2015
2016
2017

Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy

1.00
0.98
0.91
.50

3
1
2
2

Majority
Opinions

1
1
3
1

Concurring
Opinions

Dissenting
Opinions

1
3
3
1
0

2

1
1

1
2

1
2
1
2

1
1

2
3
0
1
2
1
2
0

1

1
3
3

1

4
1
2
2

Total

54
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3

2

2
1

Opinions
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Table B: Collocates for “Dignity” in Kennedy’s Dignity Opinions by
Type of Dignity
Government Interference
Institutional Dignity
Collocates
Collocates
Occurring Three or More
Occurring Three or More
Times
Times
Frequency Collocate
Frequency
Collocate
12
persons
6
state
9
respect
6
respect
9
personal
6
court
9
human
3
states
8
all
3
sovereign*
7
equal
3
preserve
6
same
3
foreign
6
central
3
affront
5
protection
3
afforded
5
own
2*
sovereignty
5
individual
1*
sovereigns
4
integrity
4
choices
4
autonomy
4
amendment
4
act
3
upon
3
state
3
privacy
3
person
3
Oregon
3
nation
3
man
3
guarantees
3
death
3
court
3
basic
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147.
148.

See COLUCCI, supra note 24; KNOWLES, supra note 24.
See Tribe, supra note 21.

04/24/2019 08:06:49



41275 hco_46-4 Sheet No. 22 Side B

Table B presents a collocate analysis for words within five words of
Kennedy’s use of dignity performed as part of a Key Words in Context
(KWIC) analysis. The data in Table B is limited to those words that show
up at least three times near one of Kennedy’s uses of dignity, while excluding
articles, conjunctions, and prepositions for the sake of clarity. The
exceptions, marked with an * above, are that we included “sovereignty” and
“sovereigns” to accompany “sovereign,” even though Kennedy does not use
sovereigns or sovereign at least three times (twice and once, respectively).
We included these as they are variations of sovereign, which Kennedy does
use three times near dignity, and it is an important aspect to institutional
dignity for Kennedy.
We ran the KWIC and collocates analyses to compare how Kennedy
was presenting “dignity” in the cases we identified as pertaining to
“government interference” dignity and “institutional dignity.” While we are
not exploring the contours and full meaning of dignity for Kennedy in this
piece, we include this analysis as a check to see if “dignity” is a coherent
enough legal concept for Kennedy—again, without fully exploring what this
concept means for Kennedy here—to justify our use of this legal concept,
and of Kennedy, as an example of how a median justice can use his or her
institutional position to pursue legal goals. For the purpose of this analysis
we are looking for rough consistency to suggest, as we suspect, that there is
consistency to how Kennedy discusses dignity in his opinions for the
Supreme Court.147
More of Kennedy’s dignity opinions address the government
interference strand of dignity rather than institutional dignity, and thus there
are more entries for collocates for this more-common form of dignity.
However, both sets of words indicate a focus on inherent value to both
individuals and institutions of which dignity is a part. “Respect” is a
common element to how Kennedy discusses both forms of dignity, and we
see focus on “persons,” “humans,” and “all” for government interference
dignity, and “state” and “states” for institutional dignity, suggesting common
levels of focus in each area, just on a different scale. In many ways, these
uses track with how Kennedy discussed the concept of dignity in his Senate
confirmation hearings, as we discuss in our introduction. We argue that the
collocates, as well as a review of the overall KWIC analysis indicates enough
consistency for how Kennedy presents dignity in these two areas that treating
“dignity” as a valid, consistent legal concept for Kennedy is justified in the
context of the present study.148

